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Conventional wisdom provides an increasingly strong 
endorsement of far-reaching decentralization and delegation of aufhority 
to bureaucratic agents as the most likely mechanisms to attain such 
central environmental policy goals as pollution prevention, cross-media 
regulatory integration, and development of reliable measures of 
environmental outcomes. Canada would appear an unusually fertile 
context for such innovation, given its far-reaching deference to 
individual provinces and their environment ministries in environmental 
policy. Comparative analysis of select subnational governments in 
Canada and the United States suggests that the states in general are far 
ahead of their provincial counterparts in most of these areas of 
innovation. Despite all the opprobrium heaped on the American 
environmental policy system, a combination of federal policy tools and 
state policy entrepreneurship appear to contribute directly to this 
innovation in some states and are almost completely absent in the 
Canadian system. These findings suggest a need for careful study of the 
mix of intergovernmental policy tools and principal-agent relations 
most likely to realize desired environmental policy goals. 
Bashing the American federal government approach to environmental 
policy has become an increasingly popular activity for scholarly and journalistic 
analysts in recent years. These extremely negative accounts take numerous forms 
but tend to accentuate two particularly severe alleged shortcomings. First, the 
American system is perceived to suffer from excessive national governmental 
influence. The widely noted reference to the federal “gorilla in the closet” 
commonly is laced with assertions that the gorilla is on the rampage and out of 
control. Consequently, Congress drafts overly complex, command-and-control 
legislation that thwarts creative and effective policy implementation. Second, the 
U. S .  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) commonly is alleged to suffer 
from every conceivable sort of bureaucratic pathology. If not humbled and 
micromanaged by an overeager and fragmented Congress, the agency is seen as 
overzealous in its own right. As a result, state, local, and industry initiatives 
consistently are deterred by a central bureaucracy preoccupied with strict rule 
adherence and turf protection. 
Analysts have been somewhat less exacting with reform proposals, 
although these have tended to flow directly from the central criticisms. A growing 
theme in environmental policy analysis has been advocacy for far-reaching 
decentralization. State, local, and regional authorities increasingly are depicted as 
more capable and innovative than their central-level counterparts. Indeed, in some 
areas of analysis, such as the growing body of scholarship on protection of 
“common-pool resources,” it appears that subnational units can do little wrong and 
national units can do little right. In turn, other analysts call for a more European- 
style approach to environmental policy, with more generalized national legislation 
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that affords far more latitude to agencies and gives them license to negotiate 
creative and consensual agreements with regulated parties. 
Surprisingly, such analysts have tended to pay remarkably little attention 
to an American neighbor that clearly exhibits the sorts of qualities so often found 
lacking in the United States. Canada operates one of the most decentralized forms 
of environmental policy of any Western nation. It eschews most of the American 
intergovernmental tools of preemption, transfer grants, and exacting medium-based 
legislation in favor of what political scientist F. L. Morton has described as “de 
fact0 provincial primacy” (Morton, 1996, p. 50). Unlike their American 
counterparts, Canadian provinces largely are free to respond to localized conditions 
and to pursue innovative, flexible approaches to environmental protection. At the 
same time, Canadian environmental agency officials retain far more latitude from 
elected principals, facing few of the legislative mandates, deadlines, hammers, and 
oversight reviews so common in the United States. Freed from the shackles of 
exacting, American-style legislation and formal procedural requirements, Canadian 
bureaucrats should be well positioned to devise “win-win” strategies that achieve 
significant environmental gains at reasonable economic cost. 
This analysis is intended, along with other articles in this symposium, to 
begin to fill the void in comparative Canadian-American environmental policy 
research and to explore the respective capacities of these distinctive systems. In 
particular, it examines the response of Canadian and American environmental 
policy to challenges that commonly have been raised in both nations and 
elsewhere. Given the penchant for regulatory fragmentation, which nation has 
made the most progress in integrating regulatory tools such as permitting to 
reduce cross-media transfers and minimize undisclosed emissions? Given the 
concern over the prevalence of pollution “control” approaches that attempt to 
contain pollutants after generation, which nation has taken the most significant 
steps toward developing meaningful systems of pollution “prevention”? Given the 
historic paucity of reliable and accessible evidence on pollutant levels and releases, 
particularly those toxic substances deemed to pose the greatest threat to public 
health, which nation has come farthest in developing information disclosure 
systems to inform the citizenry and provide more reliable data to guide policy? 
Given doubts over the trends of environmental quality and the relative impact of 
policy on emission levels, which nation has made the most progress in developing 
measures of environmental “outcomes” and demonstrating reduced levels of toxic 
releases to air, land, and water? 
The conventional wisdom in many environmental policy circles in all 
likelihood would hypothesize that Canada should be substantially advanced beyond 
the United States in all four areas. Comparable levels of economic development 
and public concern over environmental issues would suggest a common footing 
for environmental protection efforts, bringing into advantage Canada’s perceived 
virtues of decentralization and bureaucratic delegation (Lipset, 1990). However, 
this analysis of the past decade of experience in the two nations, particularly in 
four distinct Canadian provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Ontario) 
and four distinct American states (Arizona, Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
Oklahoma), suggests the c0ntrary.l Despite remarkably common patterns of 
problem recognition of each of these four areas by a host of think tanks, 
governmental commissions, roundtables, and policy analysts on both sides of the 
49th parallel, the United States has been much more active and effective in 
devising innovative policy approaches. Consequently, this analysis concludes 
that, at least in our sample jurisdictions, the United States is clearly “ahead” of 
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Canada in cross-media permit integration, pollution prevention, disclosure of 
information on toxic substances, and achieving greater refinement and use of 
environmental outcome indicators. 
Ironically, this analysis will suggest that the two factors that 
theoretically should give Canada the edge over the United States appear to work in 
the opposite direction. This is not to suggest that the United States somehow has 
resolved all of its institutional and environmental problems and now operates a 
smooth-running regulatory process that eliminates cross-media transfers and fosters 
pollution prevention at every turn. Indeed, dramatically varying degrees of 
progress are evident in differing American state jurisdictions. Nor is it to suggest 
that Canada has made no progress whatsoever in these areas. Nonetheless, this 
comparative case analysis finds striking and consistent differences that run counter 
to the prevailing views that decentralization and bureaucratic discretion are 
unalloyed virtues in environmental policy. 
The Role of Federalism 
The underlying premise behind most proposals to decentralize 
environmental policy is its presumed capacity to unleash creative, “bottom-up” 
energies, but Canada’s three-decade experiment with widespread delegation of most 
environmental functions to its provinces reveals little subnational innovation. 
Instead, most provinces adhere to medium-based, pollution control-oriented 
regulatory systems constructed in the 1970s, appear eager to bend existing 
regulations to satisfy the overriding imperative of economic development, provide 
minimal enforcement or monitoring of regulated parties, and engage in minimal 
policy learning or idea diffusion with neighboring provinces or the federal 
government. 
Unlike the United States, it is difficult to discern a significant federal 
presence in many key areas of Canadian environmental policy. Ottawa has 
established a variety of national legislation, but most decisions on standards, 
permitting, monitoring, inspection, and enforcement are left to its subnational 
units. As one Industry Canada official has observed, “Canada may have its version 
of the American federal gorilla in the closet, but the beast may well die from lack 
of oxygen.” This timidity is attributable to a variety of factors, including 
constitutional delegation of much authority over natural resources and commerce 
to provinces, enduring federal reluctance to alienate more independently minded 
provinces such as Quebec and Alberta, and the substantial physical areas of most 
provinces that serve to limit direct cross-boundary conflicts. In response, most 
provinces have developed their own, medium-based systems of pollution control. 
Standards vary significantly across provinces, and although there is no evidence to 
indicate formal “races-to-the-bottom” provinces clearly are reluctant in any way to 
alienate industries that might transfer investments to less-rigorous provinces. As 
one provincial official noted, “the bottom line is not environmental protection 
here, but economic development” (Harrison, 1996, p. 137). 
The economic development imperative is evident through review of each 
of the four provincial cases. Provincial officials and official documents talk 
frequently and positively about the need for pursuing greater integration across 
medium boundaries, promoting pollution prevention, and developing more 
thorough and reliable measures of environmental quality and outcomes. In 
addition, provinces have initiated an unending array of roundtables, commissions, 
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conferences, and study groups to explore such alternatives (Doering, 1993). 
However, in practice, they emphasize consistently the impediments to the 
realization of such goals, often noting resource scarcity, excessive complexity, and 
a reluctance to act unilaterally and to alienate core industries that are accustomed to 
and content with existing arrangements. In one representative example, the 
province of Ontario appeared likely to make major shifts in environmental policy 
through the 1989 election of a New Democratic Party government that ran 
successfully on a platform that emphasized the need for a major overhaul of 
environmental policy and major new commitments to pollution prevention. 
However, by the end of its mandate, the government largely had abandoned 
promised steps and instead emphasized environmental protection as a tool of 
economic development, backing away from new regulatory and prevention 
initiatives in favor of trying to promote export of Ontario-based environmental 
technology and expertise (Rabe, 1997a). 
A growing consensus in the literature on Canadian regulatory federalism 
accentuates the “buck-passing” tendencies of such a system (Harrison, 1996; 
Skogstad, 1996; VanderZwaag & Duncan, 1992). This suggests a pattern whereby 
both federal and provincial governments attempt to take popular, symbolic steps 
for which it is easy to claim credit, but blame-avoidance generally prevails, with 
federal officials reluctant to offend provincial independence and provincial 
authorities reluctant to do anything that might disturb established patterns or 
relationships. In turn, despite the Canadian tradition of “executive federalism,” 
which brings elected provincial and federal officials together to explore issues, 
there appears to be very limited serious engagement of ideas and innovations 
across provincial boundaries and between provinces and Ottawa. No province or 
provinces have emerged as Canadian pace-setters, playing the role commonly 
assumed in the United States by states such as California, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin, taking steps that are studied widely and 
emulated often by other states. Under Canadian federalism, provincial officials are 
far more autonomous and insulated in terms of devising alternative regulatory 
approaches. Indeed, provincial officials appear to be far less familiar with 
innovative programs in neighboring provinces than do state officials of activities 
in other states. 
The American approach to regulatory federalism is much messier, with 
the federal imprint far firmer in virtually every area of environmental policy where 
states play some role (Scheberle, 1997). National legislation remains largely 
medium-based and pollution control-oriented, and relations between federal and 
state officials frequently are strained. Often this results in dramatic conflicts and 
state lamentations over perceived federal overreach; perhaps the most heavily 
publicized example of such conflict in recent years is the mayor of Columbus, 
Ohio’s vigorous campaign against federal water pollution standards and his 
riveting example of mandatory testing for chemicals used only in growing 
pineapples, hardly a staple crop in central Ohio. 
At the same time, some aspects of the American federal system appear to 
have contributed to far more regulatory integration and innovation than can be 
discerned in the more decentralized Canadian system. As Frank Baumgartner and 
Bryan Jones have noted, “the multiple venues of the states and the federal 
government sometimes coalesce into a single system of positive-feedback, each 
encouraging the other to enact stronger reforms than might otherwise occur” 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 232). In each of the four areas examined in this 
article, the federal government imprint is evident in contributing to significant 
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innovative steps. Contrary to the buck-pass, blame-avoid penchant of Canadian 
federalism, America’s intergovernmental partners have been involved more actively 
in efforts to promote integration, prevention, information disclosure, and improved 
outcome measurement. In New Jersey, for example, the federal presence has been 
evident through an extensive series of grants to underwrite innovative state 
programs, the regional office of the federal EPA has supported state regulatory 
experiments, and newer federal legislation such as the 1990 Pollution Prevention 
Act has provided a clear impetus to state prevention and related efforts. Moreover, 
major strides in information disclosure and outcome measurement, manifest in the 
maturation of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), reflect a 15-year dialectic 
between federal officials and counterparts in New Jersey and other states in moving 
the United States toward a well-established common denominator of environmental 
quality that is only beginning to emerge in Canada. 
Diffusion of state innovation appears to be established more firmly in the 
American federal system, facilitated in part by federal grants, associations, and 
networks linking various states and regions. Throughout American regulatory 
federalism, one sees far more engagement and tension between national and 
subnational units. It also is evident that, as in Canada, there is tremendous 
variation in the extent to which individual states are able or willing to design 
innovative programs (Lowry, 1992; Rabe, 1997b). Indeed, a number of American 
states, such as Oklahoma, rival Canadian provinces in accentuating economic 
development as their overriding environmental policy mission. Nonetheless, for 
all the opprobrium heaped on American regulatory federalism, there appear to be 
certain dynamics that facilitate innovation not detectable in its more decentralized 
neighbor. 
The Role of Agencies and Policy Entreprenemhip 
Many of the most strident critics of American environmental policy 
couple their concerns over a more centralized form of federalism with their 
perception that overzealous legislators stifle bureaucratic creativity. 
Commentators as diverse as Philip Howard, Stephen Breyer, Eugene Bardach, and 
Robert Kagan, among others, have implored legislators to cast aside prescriptive 
legislation and give nonelected experts the freedom to develop more flexible and 
effective policy (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Breyer, 1993; Howard, 1994). 
Bureaucrats presumably thus would be unleashed to work collegially and creatively 
with regulated parties. 
In many respects, the Canadian system appears to be a well-established 
model for what these critics now endorse for the United States. National and 
provincial legislators draft relatively brief, general environmental legislation that 
affords enormous latitude to implementing ministries. In Alberta, for example, 
the 1995 Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act compressed all existing 
environmental statutes into a single document with 139 pages of text. It is loaded 
with emphases on bureaucratic discretion, making repeated use of the phrase 
“allows for” in authorizing numerous Alberta Environmental Protection initiatives 
to develop new regulatory tools that recognize “the interdependence between air, 
land and water.” At the same time that most provincial legislation is highly 
delegative to ministry officials, legislative oversight of ministries is very limited 
and new governments usually can make very few changes in ministry leadership 
positions. “In most provinces, only a handful of legislators know anything about 
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the environment and often environment ministers are not exactly environmental 
specialists,” explained one former provincial official. “This means the power is in 
the bureaucracy and the bureaucracy can do largely what it wants.” 
That latitude, despite its appeal to some American critics, does not appear 
to translate into bureaucratic flexibility and innovation in most instances. 
Provincial and federal environment ministries have proven extremely reluctant to 
move beyond traditional measures of pollution control. In Alberta, environment 
ministry officials acknowledge the latitude provided by legislation but emphasize 
numerous resource and technical barriers that prevent deviation from conventional 
practice. Similar interpretations are provided in other provinces. “Several Ontario 
governments in the 80s and 90s have tried to move their ministry to think about 
things like cross-media integration and pollution prevention,” recalled one former 
provincial environment minister: 
But a new government comes in and generally has to work with the 
existing bureaucracy. In general, they have been there a long time and 
think they know better. They hunker down and resist change, do 
essentially what they’ve always done, and just wait for the government 
to fall and start all over again with the next one. 
Many observers concur that Canadian provincial environmental officials maintain 
a very low public profile and are far less likely to have direct contact with 
legislators or interest group representatives than are their American counterparts. 
“We just don’t see them very much,” explained one individual with experience in 
both industry and advocacy groups: 
They don’t come to conferences or meetings very often, they’re not part 
of the network that looks at options. And yet they have power. 
They’re the ones who, when approached by a new government, talk 
them out of doing something new or into deferring to a committee of 
bureaucrats which reviews matters but concludes nothing new can be 
done. 
This dynamic helps to explain why Canadian federal and provincial authorities tend 
to talk so extensively about alternatives but remain wedded to traditional 
approaches that are being abandoned in many parts of the United States. In 
contrast, American state environmental agencies not only appear to face more 
direct oversight from federal and state legislatures but also have experienced far 
more personnel turnover and have proven to be more receptive to alternative 
approaches than have their Canadian counterparts. In three of the four states 
included in this study, state policy initiatives were promoted directly from within 
agencies, often by officials particularly committed to a new approach and able to 
work effectively with such diverse constituencies as industry, environmental 
groups, federal officials, and state legislators. 
Such “policy entrepreneurship” suggests that American agencies may be 
less browbeaten than conventional wisdom indicates and that they indeed are 
capable of devising and implementing new ideas. As political scientist Mark 
Schneider and colleagues note in their research on subnational policy innovation, 
“policy entrepreneurs tend to be ‘policy generalists’ who tkke great interest in 
developments outside of their own narrow area of present interest. Therefore, they 
are always looking for potential solutions that they may adapt into their area of 
current policy interest” (O’Grady & Chi, 1995; Schneider & Teske, with 
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Mintrom, 1995, p. 48). In each of the areas examined in this paper, entrepreneurs 
borrowed ideas from “policy communities” that crossed state, programmatic, and 
disciplinary lines. In pollution prevention, for example, officials in state and 
federal agencies and industries tend to be highly alert to each other’s efforts and 
interact regularly through groups such as the National Pollution Prevention 
Roundtable. If New Jersey begins to experiment with linking pollution 
prevention planning to facility-wide permitting, as it has over the past half-decade, 
officials from at least four other states from around the nation already have visited 
New Jersey to study this initiative and to consider basing their reforms on it. 
Such networking is facilitated further by federal efforts, including grants and 
information dissemination, that bring new energy to intrastate innovation and 
cross-state interaction. 
Ironically, the greater latitude afforded Canadian bureaucrats does not 
appear to unleash their creative talents, freeing them instead to adhere to traditional 
regulatory approaches that increasingly are suspect. This is consistent with the 
finding that the greatest impediments to policy innovation stem from intraagency 
resistance (Borins, 1998). Moreover, massive cutbacks in environmental program 
budgets and personnel in most of the provinces in very recent years have provided 
further disincentive to policy innovation. Between fiscal years 1995 and 1998. 
environmental program expenditures in current dollars were cut 60% in 
Newfoundland, 43% in Ontario, and 29% in Alberta (Gallon, 1998). At the same 
time, the American environmental policy scene remains far more conflictual and 
indeed features numerous instances of “noninnovation.” Like their Canadian 
provincial counterparts, several of the most active and innovative states 
experienced major budget and staff cuts in 1997 and 1998 that put continued 
pursuit of alternatives into jeopardy. Nonetheless, the comparative case findings 
suggest a good deal more receptivity to innovation in the American states and 
more capacity to move beyond lip service to actual experimentation and 
implementation than in Canada. 
RegulatoryTmls: Permitting 
Both Canada and the United States have relied on common tools such as 
permitting and enforcement to implement environmental programs (United States 
Office of Technology Assessment, 1995). Permitting involves the development 
of formal documents that limit pollutant releases from a facility to individual 
environmental media and that often set specific requirements for abatement 
methods and reporting. Consistent with other areas of policy, permitting 
authority is almost completely decentralized in Canada and tends to be 
implemented by states with federal oversight in the United States. In both 
nations, permitting has been cited widely by analysts as highly fragmented and as 
a frequent source of cross-media pollutant mnsfer and duplicative requirements. 
All eight jurisdictions in this study have made recent efforts to develop a 
more efficient permitting process. This most commonly entails more unified 
paper processing and technical assistance for permit applicants. Many provinces 
and states also are exploring expanded use of computers to provide more rapid 
tracking and approval of various permits. Perhaps no unit of government has 
gone as far in this regard as Oklahoma. Through its 1994 Uniform Permitting 
Act and establishment of a highly visible Customer Services Division in its 
Department of Environmental Quality, Oklahoma has made a massive effort to 
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streamline permitting review processes. As state documents note, the agency 
“does not want to be placed in the position of halting or slowing a project that 
will bring jobs to the state” (Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality, 
1997, p. 2). The Oklahoma effort is placing concerted pressure on all officials 
involved with permitting to make compliance as automatic as possible. It offers 
numerous forms of assistance to permit applicants, particularly firms from outside 
the state contemplating a move to Oklahoma. 
This initiative, and other more modest ones in states and provinces, 
indeed may accelerate permit decisions but in no way are designed to reduce cross- 
media transfers or to foster pollution prevention in permitting decisions. Indeed, 
Oklahoma authorities have concluded that, at least for the present, taking such 
considerations into account is not feasible in existing permitting. Similar 
decisions have been reached in respective provinces, which also have concentrated 
their energies on permit streamlining. Environment Canada (1995, p. xxiii) 
encouraged provinces to examine more integrative permit reforms in the United 
States and elsewhere in a 1995 report, but there is no evidence that this 
recommendation has been followed. In provinces such as Ontario, for example, 
environment ministry officials repeatedly have resisted encouragement to find ways 
to integrate permitting across medium boundaries. Most frequently, officials have 
noted technical difficulties and the continuing provincial imperative of attempting 
to implement its 1986 water quality program, the Municipal/Industrial Strategy 
for Abatement (MISA), before turning more aggressively to other media or to any 
form of integration. “There is an inability to think about multi-media issues in 
the ranks of the ministry,” notes one former provincial official. “An old guard has 
hung on and insists nothing new can be tried until every aspect of MISA is 
settled.” A provincial environmental group leader explained: 
We know this is being tried in the States and in Europe and there is no 
real industry or environmental opposition to trying integrated 
permitting here. But the bureaucracy says no. They claim they sign off 
on each other’s paperwork and that should cover any cross-media 
problems. But this isn’t a system of permitting, it’s plumbing by 
separate medium. 
Much permitting in the American system retains a “plumbing by 
medium” focus, but initiatives in states such as New Jersey, Minnesota, and 
Arizona suggest that more far-reaching efforts to achieve greater integration and 
procedural efficiency indeed may be possible. New Jersey has been particularly 
active in this regard, having launched a facility-wide permitting program as part of 
its far-reaching 1991 Pollution Prevention Act (Rabe, 1995). Under this law, 
nearly 900 New Jersey industrial facilities are required to report on annual chemical 
releases and specify their strategies for pollution prevention. Volunteers for 
facility-wide permitting agree to undergo a comprehensive facility analysis 
intended simultaneously to achieve greater integration and environmental 
improvement alongside increased procedural efficiency. Eight facilities, 
representing a wide range of New Jersey firms, have received such a unified permit, 
and nine more are scheduled to be issued before the end of 1999. Legislation is 
pending in the New Jersey Senate to expand this program significantly, although 
state budget cuts, related loss of key agency staff, and partisan conflicts have left 
the long-term future of the program highly uncertain. 
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The first eight cases completed under this program suggest considerable 
ability for the facility-wide permit to discover and mitigate major cross-media 
transfers, significantly expand pollution prevention efforts, address previously 
undiscovered emission releases, and substantially increase efficiency and facility 
flexibility. Republican and Democratic governors alike have participated in 
permit-signing ceremonies and attempted to claim credit for the initiative, while 
industry and environmental group representatives have been very supportive. 
Minnesota has attempted a somewhat similar effort through its “flexible permit” 
program, designed particularly for facilities with complex air pollution issues. 
Arizona has attempted to integrate permitting with pollution prevention, and in 
1997 issued its first comprehensive facility permit under the auspices of an 
experimental federal program. 
These cases are relatively few in number but suggest considerable 
promise for transforming conventional environmental policy tools. All go far 
beyond anything being attempted in the four provinces included in this study in 
terms of integration across medium boundaries. In all three states, federal 
government input has been essential. In New Jersey, the permitting and larger 
prevention planning program builds on the definition of “nonproduct output” 
established in federal prevention legislation. This results in an assessment process 
that provides a far more comprehensive picture of a facility’s chemical inputs and 
outputs than under medium-based systems. In turn, New Jersey received 
considerable cooperation from its regional EPA office, was able to secure a 
significant modification of a federal air regulatory standard that was crucial in 
achieving its permit integration, received technical assistance from EPA, and was 
the recipient of a series of federal grants that funded some of its efforts and allowed 
the implementing Office of Pollution Prevention to compensate medium-specific 
offices for “borrowing” select staff. Minnesota and Arizona have received 
comparable federal assistance in their recent permit efforts, and both have been 
heavily involved in two experimental EPA initiatives. These include Project XL, 
an outgrowth of the National Performance Review, which encourages state 
regulatory innovation and integration, and the Permit Integration Team, which 
supports state permit experimentation. In addition, the EPA signed National 
Environmental Performance Partnership agreements (NEPPs) with 40 states 
between 1995 and 1999, allowing participating states added flexibility in pursuing 
priorities and using federal grants for innovative programs. 
The cases also underscore the capacity of state agency officials to work 
effectively as policy entrepreneurs, building supportive coalitions and amassing 
resources to try new approaches. In each of the three states, officials emerged who 
were committed to the idea of cross-media integration and who had prior experience 
in different areas of environmental policy. “We didn’t have to change any existing 
federal laws to do this but a lot of effort had to come from within the agency,” 
explained one official pivotal in the New Jersey effort: 
We sought diverse, highly-motivatcd people to participate, people who 
were well-respected in specific areas and who like to ask questions. 
This isn’t for everybody but a lot of people in the department would 
like to be part of this. 
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Pollution F%x!vention 
Both Canadian and American analysts of environmental policy began to 
concur in the 1980s that their respective systems suffered from a pollution control 
emphasis that often failed to consider preventive options. In Canada, Pollution 
Robe became particularly prominent in this area with a popular book published in 
1983. In the United States, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
emerged as a leading advocate of pollution prevention with a series of heavily 
publicized reports in the late 1980s. A wide array of subsequent studies and 
reports in both nations, provided by such groups as the International Joint 
Commission, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Rawson Academy, 
the World Wildlife Fund, and the National Academy of Public Administration. 
among others, have confirmed these initial contributions. 
Common problem definition, however, has not translated into common 
national responses to the challenge of moving toward a more preventive approach. 
As in the case of integration, Canadian authorities and observers have waxed long 
and eloquently on the topic, but more than 15 years after the release of the 
Pollution Probe study very little institutional shift toward prevention is evident at 
either federal or provincial levels (Rabe, 1997a). In contrast, the American system 
remains oriented toward medium-based pollution control, but increasingly has 
demonstrated capacity to design new programs and instruments that begin more 
systematically to promote preventive strategies. These American efforts are 
unified by a common definition of pollution prevention and a standardized 
hierarchy of preferred approaches to environmental protection set forth in 1990 
federal pollution prevention legislation. 
Canadian federal authorities have continued to struggle for a uniform 
definition of pollution prevention, despite numerous high-level endorsements of 
the general concept. A 1994 House of Commons study and a 1995 Environment 
Canada study concede that Canada has made minimal progress toward establishing 
a common definition of pollution prevention, much less significant programmatic 
progress. Both reports recommend that federal and provincial officials pay greater 
attention to the United States and its more promising pollution prevention 
experiments in considering alternatives for Canada (Environment Canada, 1995; 
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development, 1994). 
In theory, programs such as the 1988 Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act (CEPA) encourage prevention by gathering most existing programs under one 
legislative heading. However, this legislation has limited impact on provincial 
actions and has no specific mechanisms to encourage preventive approaches. The 
federal government did create a National Office of Pollution Prevention in 1991 to 
“work cooperatively with industry,” and this has led to some informal 
collaborative efforts with specific industrial sectors. Ottawa also has established a 
Great Lakes Pollution Prevention Centre, located in Ontario, to disseminate 
information on pollution prevention opportunities, but, as one former federal 
official noted: 
these were largely symbolic steps. In many respects, we were so 
embarrassed after [then EPA Administrator William] Reilly visited [in 
the early 9Os] and we saw what the U.S. was doing, we felt we had to 
do something in response. So there was great pressure to get the Office 
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and the Centre going, even though they have very limited staff and face 
huge turf resistance. 
Potentially more substantial steps, such as large transfer grants to provinces, were 
promised but never materialized. The so-called Green Plan of 1990 was launched 
with great fanfare and suggested an unprecedented federal commitment to 
supporting and encouraging provincial environmental policy innovation, but in 
reality Green Plan dollars never approached initial estimates and largely were 
concentrated on conventional economic development strategies (Doern, 1992). 
Indeed, Canada has made minimal use of grants as a tool to promote provincial 
innovation or support for federal goals in environmental policy. 
Left largely to their own devices, all of the provinces examined in this 
study have some official pollution prevention program. These programs most 
commonly emphasize technical assistance and training for industry, providing 
information clearinghouses, and publicizing pollution prevention “success 
stories.” In Ontario, the Pollution Prevention Office of the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy has offered a “challenge” to various industries to pledge 
to reduce certain types of emissions, based loosely on the earlier experience of the 
U.S. EPA’s “33/50” program. However, these provincial programs tend to be 
completely voluntary and are largely isolated from other sections of provincial 
environment ministries. Moreover, prevention programs in Alberta, Manitoba, 
and Newfoundland tend to emphasize recycling and reuse far more than prevention 
and source reduction. Promising early efforts to promote hazardous waste 
reduction in Alberta and Manitoba, in conjunction with comprehensive siting 
efforts, have been impaired seriously by privatization of provincial waste 
management corporations and reclassification of large categories of hazardous 
waste as solid waste. 
Pollution prevention appears to be beginning to move beyond these 
narrow parameters in at least three of the four states included in this study. 
Arizona, Minnesota, and New Jersey all have had statutory requirements for 
pollution prevention planning since h e  early 1990s. These involve all industrial 
facilities required to report their emissions under the federal TRI. Each state has 
established somewhat different provisions, but all generally require participants to 
complete an annual facility review of their pollution prevention objectives, specify 
intended methods to achieve reductions, and set near-term and long-term reduction 
goals. Planning participants also must provide formal reporting on the results of 
their efforts to state authorities. In Minnesota, for example, this planning process 
is an integral component of a much larger pollution prevention effort, which 
includes fees on toxic releases, specific linkages between prevention planning and 
other regulatory areas such as inspection and enforcement, and a series of grant and 
incentive programs to encourage industries to pursue prevention with vigor. In 
turn, New Jersey’s planning efforts emphasize comprehensive “materials 
accounting” to examine all chemical inputs and outputs for facilities required to 
report, thereby setting up a requirement that each participant specify a series of 
numeric, 5-year goals for pollution prevention. As one analysis of this initiative 
concluded, such planning led participating facilities to set and achieve pollution 
prevention goals far beyond what could have been anticipated in the absence of 
such planning (Hampshire Research Associates, 1996). It also has provided an 
essential component in a variety of cross-media integration strategies, including 
facility-wide permitting. 
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No two state pollution prevention initiatives are identical, yet many have 
derived direct and extensive support from the federal government. Whereas there is 
virtually no discernible relationship between federal and provincial pollution 
prevention activities in Canada, states such as Arizona, Minnesota, and New 
Jersey have relied heavily on various forms of federal assistance. One industry 
analyst has gone so far as to note: “The force that is really moving pollution 
prevention forward is the federal government” (Hanson, 1992, pp. 21-22). Unlike 
the Canadian Green Plan, federal grants have been essential in state pollution 
prevention efforts. EPA Pollution Prevention Incentives for States grants have 
provided substantial assistance since 1988 (Krieger, 1992), as have more recent 
efforts to integrate 12 distinct EPA grant programs under the auspices of the 
Performance Partnership Grant. A 1994 U.S. General Accounting Office report 
concluded that federal transfer dollars accounted for approximately 40% of total 
state pollution prevention expenditures and were crucial to the development and 
continuance of many (United States General Accounting Office, 1994). These 
funds have tended to prove especially crucial in those states that, unlike 
Minnesota, lack a direct source of prevention program funding. 
The EPA also has experimented with merging pollution prevention goals 
with other programmatic activities. For example, EPA interpretations of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments increasingly involve “incorporating pollution 
prevention into the regulatory process” and phasing out the use of dozens of toxic 
chemicals (Anderson, 1994, p. 66). In addition, firms have been encouraged to 
take extensive prevention steps in advance of formal air regulations through the 
provision of “credits” under the Early Reduction Program. Furthermore, the 
agency increasingly is integrating compliance with prevention, using the 
Supplemental Environmental Projects program to mandate that firms deemed to be 
out of compliance with existing regulations expand pollution prevention 
commitments in exchange for reduced fines and penalties (Krukowski, 1993; 
Stahl, 1993). Perhaps most important, state officials concur that many of their 
current pollution prevention activities would be rendered nearly impossible in the 
absence of a national TRI. Indeed, more recent expansions of the initial inventory, 
discussed in the next section, already are yielding added data and allowing 
development of new tools for state officials eager to explore pollution prevention 
options. 
As in the case of permit integration, state pollution prevention policy is 
influenced heavily by state agency advocates. Many of these individuals have 
played an active role in lobbying legislatures, securing federal and other resources, 
and maintaining support for their initiatives. State, federal, and industry officials 
with strong interests in pollution prevention represent an increasingly well- 
integrated policy community, laden with policy enttepreneurs. In Minnesota, for 
example, such entrepreneurs were essential figures in completing reports and 
conducting hearings in the state capitol that set the stage for passage of the 1990 
Toxic Pollution Prevention Act. Officials from the Minnesota Office of 
Environmental Assistance are required statutorily to report to the legislature every 
other year on the performance of their pollution prevention initiatives and have 
used these opportunities to gain publicity for specific reforms that are embraced 
later by the Minnesota legislature. Such entrepreneurs clearly have retained the 
confidence of Minnesota governors and key legislators, giving them considerable 
ability to direct the program, and have become leaders in national pollution 
prevention circles. 
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Information Disclosure on Toxic Releases 
A pivotal component in American progress on regulatory integration and 
pollution prevention has been the emergence of basic information on toxic releases 
to air, land, and water on an annual basis. Prior to the creation of the U.S. TRI 
through 1986 federal legislation, such essential information was very limited. It 
tended to be available only in fragmentary form, with tremendous variation from 
medium to medium. The federal TRI legislation was based heavily on prior 
experiments in Maryland and New Jersey, and the program has continued to evolve 
through federal scrutiny of continuing state innovation. After more than a decade 
of refinement and expansion, according to analysts John Brehm and James 
Hamilton, “TRI data have become the yardstick by which regulators, advocacy 
groups, industry officials, and investors judge the pollution records of 
manufacturing companies” (Brehm & Hamilton, 1996, pp. 445446). All of the 
states pursuing initiatives in permit integration and pollution prevention have 
made considerable use of these data, often relying on them to discern the extent of 
current releases and target the most promising areas for intervention. 
In Canada, however, such an information disclosure system is in far more 
rudimentary stages of development. No provinces saw fit to follow the pioneering 
steps of Maryland and New Jersey, and the first creation of a national inventory of 
releases was delayed until 1993. The National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) 
completed its first national data release in 1995, although it remains quite limited 
in comparison with the American system. I t  includes only 178 chemicals, as 
opposed to 595 in the United States, and has a higher release threshold that must 
be crossed before reporting is required. The NPRI does include a subset of 
facilities not required to report under the TRI, but provides far more options for 
exemptions and more extensive opportunities to maintain confidentiality 
concerning releases. Moreover, Canada has far more modest penalties for and less 
monitoring of facility noncompliance than the United States and thus far has 
achieved a very low facility compliance rate. 
Perhaps more significantly, there is little evidence to suggest that either 
Canadian federal, provincial, or industrial authorities have begun to invest 
seriously in the NPRI as a potential tool to foster innovation (Environment 
Canada, 1995). Environment Canada devotes only two staff positions and about 
$1 million (American) to processing and disseminating NPRI forms and has given 
little indication of pursuing the broad public distribution strategies of NPRI data 
so common under the TRI. This level of staff, resource, and outreach 
commitment is far less than many individual American states under the TRI, 
including three of the four included in this study. Initial Green Plan commitments 
to pump considerable funds into environmental information dissemination projects 
never approached initial dollar estimates and eschewed the NPRI in favor of more 
modest public information and education programs. 
Moreover, there is minimal indication that any provinces have begun to 
consider actively how thc NPRI might be used either to inform the general 
citizenry or to promote regulatory integration and prevention. Provincial 
environment ministry annual reports published in the late 1990s make virtually no 
reference to the first rounds oC NPRI findings, much less indicate any effort to use 
them to guide future policy. Provincial pollution prevention programs appear 
completely disconnccted from the NPRI to date. The four cases included in this 
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study suggest that the greatest interest in the NPRI and its potential uses appears 
to be concentrated among national environmental interest groups, with few signs 
of the policy entrepreneurship within provincial agencies that has been so evident 
in a number of states. 
While information disclosure remains in fairly primitive stages in 
Canada, the American TRI system continues to expand and mature. Building on 
the initial 1986 program, the TRI has been refined in at least four major ways. 
First, 1988 changes expanded TRI reporting so that participating facilities must 
provide a full picture of the types of treatment or containment technologies being 
used. “This information has been the key indicator for several federal and state 
pollution prevention programs,” according to Minnesota pollution prevention 
officials (Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance, 1996, p. 28). Second, 
the 1990 Pollution Prevention Act further expanded the TRI to require reporting 
on waste management practices and pollution prevention activities. These 
information sources have played an essential role in distinguishing prevention 
practices from treatment, recycling, and energy recovery options, and have proven 
especially useful in new program initiatives in states such as Arizona, Minnesota, 
and New Jersey. They also have provided an impetus to state hazardous waste 
reduction efforts. Third, in 1994, the original list of 309 chemical substances 
required to be reported under the TRI was expanded, with 286 additional ones. 
Many of these new substances are active ingredients in  pesticides, making it 
increasingly possible that states can use TRI data to consider preventive and 
integrative approaches to pesticide policy. Fourth, a series of additional revisions 
have been made, expanding the roster of TRI reporting participants to include all 
federal facilities and electric power plane. 
There remain many questions concerning the TRI. Even expanding the 
list of reported chemicals to nearly 600 still leaves gaps given the thousands of 
chemicals currently used industrially. There also are serious questions about the 
accuracy of self-reported release data, toxic materials contained in manufactured 
products, and the practices of those facilities not yet required to participate (Brehm 
& Hamilton, 1996; Davies & Mazurek, 1997; Malkin, Baskir, & Spooner, 1995). 
Nonetheless, survey findings confirm that TRI data are receiving increasingly 
heavy use from environmental agencies, public interest groups, and industry. As 
one American industry manager noted: 
TRI’s mere existence has revolutionized environmental reporting. For 
the first time, engineers have had to scrutinize their processes as a 
whole and quantify releases to all media. As an investigative and 
measurement tool, this multimedia inventory has helped provide a 
baseline of certain toxics’ release and. in some cases, has revealed 
valuable information for process improvements that otherwise might 
not have received adequate attention (World Wildlife Fund, 1994). 
Such utilization is evident in all four of the states included in this study. 
Officials in Minnesota and New Jersey have made particularly aggressive use of 
TRI data and have taken advantage of each refinement to strengthen their own 
pollution prevention and integration efforts further. Virtually all of their program 
initiatives in these areas are predicated on the continued availability of these data. 
Arizona clearly is following in this path in more recent years, and Oklahoma has 
begun to use TRI data to chart overall environmental trends and to pinpoint major 
environmental problems. Perhaps most importantly, states are beginning to find 
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new ways to review and evaluate the raw numbers that the TRI pours forth each 
year, allowing them to target problems and opportunities that otherwise might go 
ignored. 
As in permit integration and pollution prevention, the federal role has 
been significant. It has developed and expanded the TRI in response to state 
experimentation and has made a major effort to assure widespread distribution of 
findings. In addition, the EPA has offered a series of grant programs to assist in 
the analysis and the use of TRI data. Minnesota, for example, has received federal 
funding support to study facility compliance with TRI requirements and to explore 
methods to improve compliance rates and assure enforcement. More recently, the 
EPA has distributed grants to Arizona, Minnesota, and New Jersey to support 
demonstration projects to integrate data reporting for TRI and all medium-specific 
programs in an attempt to develop a comprehensive environmental database for 
each industrial facility (Clarke, 1997). 
Outcomes vs. Outputs 
The evolution of information disclosure systems such as the TRI and 
NPRI raise the larger issue of the extent to which nations and their subnational 
units successfully can chart environmental quality trends and analyze areas of 
particular concern. Environmental policy in most Western democracies, including 
Canada and the United States, long has been criticized for its emphasis on “output” 
measures that examine the volume of work completed by an agency. Instead, 
contend critics, policy should attempt to develop “outcome” measures that take 
into account environmental performance and the attendant impact of policy 
instruments on those measures (Davies & Mazurek, 1997; United States Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1995; Wilson, 1989). 
Much of the activity in this area remains in early stages, reflected in the 
recent evolution of information disclosure systems, but a comparison of the 
provinces and states included in this analysis suggests that Canada largely remains 
absorbed with output analysis whereas the United States is in clear transition and 
making a more extensive effort to examine outcomes. In all four provinces, 
output measures are cited repeatedly in agency reports and emphasized in 
interviews. In a representative example, Newfoundland Environment annual 
reports list numerous activities completed by ministry staff. These include 
detailed measures of the total number of public addresses, responses to public 
inquiries and complaints, interviews, site inspections, prosecutions, license and 
permit approvals, studies, and memoranda completed by the ministry. Similarly, 
in the other provinces Canadian environmental agencies are remarkably thorough 
in chronicling their activity levels, and often make comparative references to show 
differing levels of outputs from year to year. Progress often is declared when these 
measures shift in preferred directions, such as increased indication of work effort. 
In contrast, one finds minimal provincial reference to measures of environmental 
quality, whether provided by the NPRI or other sources. Perhaps the biggest 
exception to this is efforts in some provinces, such as Alberta and Ontario, to 
develop measures of the health of fish and wildlife populations. Nonetheless, 
provincial ministries continue to emphasize output over outcome assessment. 
In the four American states, a more mixed picture emerges. Regulatory 
streamlining has become a growing area of interest in each of the states in recent 
years, and has led to an expanded development of earlier output measures. In 
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particular, states such as Oklahoma are putting considerable resources into 
examining the rate with which permits are issued and complaints resolved. This 
enables the Department of Environmental Quality to discover and attempt to 
address potential sources of delay, part of a major agency effort to accelerate every 
aspect of the environmental regulatory process and to ease regulatory burdens 
wherever possible. When coupled with continuing emphasis on measures of the 
numbers of permits, notices, and billings issued, among others, this gives 
Oklahoma a very extensive picture of regulatory outputs (Oklahoma Department 
of Environmental Quality, 1997). 
States such as Minnesota and New Jersey have gone much farther in 
analyzing the TRI and other environmental outcomes data sources to provide a 
fuller sense of quality trends and of the role that various policies might be playing. 
The Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance provides extensive and 
ongoing analysis, for example, of TRI data. That information not only gives a 
thorough account of overall Minnesota environmental trends but also allows 
officials to pinpoint where pollution prevention gains are-and are not-being 
realized. The Office also has made extended efforts to normalize all trend data to 
account for program and reporting changes, thereby establishing a fairly reliable 
baseline for comparison over time. These findings are used not just to inform the 
general citizenry but to tinker continually with various state programs, thereby 
linking outcomes data with policy reform (Minnesota Office of Environmental 
Assistance, 1994, 1996). New Jersey has continued to undertake similarly 
thorough analyses and thereby has developed an increasingly sophisticated 
understanding of what industrial sectors seem most responsive to pollution 
prevention opportunities, what impact facility-wide planning and permitting have 
on total facility releases and transfers, and how New Jersey compares to other 
comparably industrialized states and to the nation more generally (Aucott, 
Wachspress, & Herb, 1996; Hampshire Research Associates, 1996). None of the 
provinces included in this study have any outcomes measures or assessment 
procedures that begin to rival those of Minnesota or New Jersey in scope or rigor. 
Nationally, the TRI and NPRI remain suspect instruments for making 
direct comparisons on environmental quality and trends, in part for the sorts of 
reasons discussed above. However, initial efforls to examine releases and transfers, 
particularly when concentrating on common industrial sectors, jointly listed 
substances, and shared border regions with comparable population and industrial 
densities, suggest some strikingly different patterns. Most significantly, Canadian 
facilities appear to have a roughly comparable rate of pollutant transfer with their 
American counterparts but dramatically higher rates of pollutant release. In 
comparing the averages of all facilities and those matched by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code, Canadian firms consistently release far more 
of their chemicals directly to the air, surface water, or land than matched American 
firms. In turn, American firms prove to be more responsive to the hierarchy of 
environmental options, transferring a much higher percentage of their chemicals to 
options such as recycling, reuse, recovery, treatment, and destruction 
(Environment Canada, 1996; United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 1997). 
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Conclusions 
Prevailing views on environmental policy would lead to the hypothesis 
that decentralization from national to subnational units and delegation from 
legislative principals to bureaucratic agents would unleash creative energies and 
policy innovation. The Canadian and American experience in fostering regulatory 
integration and pollution prevention, however, offers cautionary lessons. The 
subset of American states examined generally has made more significant steps than 
the subset of Canadian provinces in the areas of permit integration, pollution 
prevention, information disclosure, and outcomes emphasis. The more expanded 
federal role in the United States appears actually to have encouraged these steps 
rather than to have precluded them. In contrast, the absence of any significant 
federal role in Canada has failed to foster a comparable, much less superior, level 
of provincial innovation. At the same time, policy entrepreneurship appears far 
more likely to flourish in the American state setting than the Canadian provincial 
one. Entrepreneurship varies from state to state but clearly plays a role in the 
formation and implementation of integrative and preventive initiatives that remain 
much harder to discern in Canadian provinces. 
This analysis is not intended to suggest that all is well in the United 
States and that all is ill in Canada in relation to environmental policy. Most 
American federal environmental legislation remains medium-based and oriented 
toward command-and-control strategies, placing enduring limits on innovation 
(Davies & Mazurek, 1997). State government capacity and commitment in 
environmental policy have grown markedly in recent decades, but it remains 
unclear if these patterns will continue, especially if federal funds and regulatory 
pressures are withdrawn. In some states with impressive track records, such as 
New Jersey and Michigan, massive budget cuts and agency reorganizations in 
recent years have led to dramatic reductions of staff available to implement 
environmental programs or pursue entrepreneurial options. Finally, the NPRI 
indeed may expand and have a growing impact on integration and prevention in 
Canada, much as the TRI has had over the past decade in the United States. 
Nonetheless, these findings serve as a reminder that American environmental 
policy may be more flexible and creative than widely assumed and that policy 
options such as decentralization and delegation must be examined carefully rather 
than merely asserted as enduring virtucs. 
*** 
Barry G.  Rabe is professor in the School of Natural Resources and 
Environment at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1115. He is 
the author of Beyond NIMBY (Brookings, 1994) and currently is examining the 
subnational politics of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in American states and 
Canadian provinces. He also is the editor of the American Governance and Public 
Policy book series for Georgetown University Press. 
Notes 
I am grateful to the Canadian Studies Faculty Research Grant Program for financial support 
that was essential to conducting field research for this project. I also would like to thank David 
Feldman. Michael Kraft. Rill Lowry. and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on 
304 
Symposium on Canadian-US. Environmental Policy: Rabe 
earlier versions of l h i s  anicle, Eden Schafer and Anne Shachoy for research assistance, and Maryellen 
Kouh  for technical support. 
Provinces and states were selected to maximize diversity across measures of 
envircmmental commitment and capability, consistent with Lester's (1990) categories of progressives, 
stmgglers, delayers, and regressives, and to assure regional diversity. These cases represent a subset 
from a larger set of provinces and states now being analyzed. More than 60 interviews were completed 
in this phase of the study, including representatives of federal, regional, provincial, and state agencies, 
industry, and advocacy groups. All interviewees were assured that their identities would not be revealed 
through attribution in the text. 
Anderson. F. R. (1994). From voluntary to regulatory pollution prevention. In B. R. Allen & D. I. 
Richards (Eds.), The greening of industrial ecosystem @p. 98-107). Washington, Dc: 
National Academy Press. 
AUCOII, M,, Wachspress, D.. & Herb, J. Trendr in New Jersey industrial pollution 
prevention. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 
Bardach, E.. & Kagan, R. A. (1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory 
unreasonableness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago, 
IL  University of Chicago Press. 
Borins. S. (1998). Innovating with integrity. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Brehm, J., & Hamilton, J. T. (1996). Noncompliance in environmental reporting: Are violators 
ignorant, or evasive, of the law? American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 444-477. 
Breyer, S. (1993). Breaking the vicious circle: Toward effective risk regulation. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Clarke, D. (1997, May 5). E pluribus unum: States integrate their environmental data. State 
Environmental Monitor, 2(5). 24-26. 
Davies, J. C.. & Mazurek, J. (1997). Regulating pollution: Does the US. system work? 
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Doering, R. (1993). Canadian round tables on the environment and the economy. International 
Environmental Affairs, 5(4), 355-370. 
Doem, G. B. (1992). John-green-latelies: The Mulroney environmental record. In F. Abele (Ed.), 
How Ottawa s p e d :  The politics of competitiveness, 1992-93 @p. 353-376). Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press. 
CEPA. Ottawa: Environmental Protection Service. 
NPRI and TRI Data. Ottawa: Environment Canada. 
do. CnMdo Watch, pp. 17-19. 
planning in New Jersey. Alexandria, VA: Hampshire Research Associates. 
industry. Chemical and Engineering News, pp. 21-22. 
University of British Columbia Press. 




Kraft (Eds.), Environmental policy in the 1990s: Toward a new agenda (pp. 59-79). 
Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Lipset, S. M. (1990). Continental divide: The values and institutions of the United States and 
Canada. New Yo&. NY: Roulledge. 
(1996). 
Environment Canada. (1 995). Environmental protection legirlation designed for the future- renewed 
Environment Canada. (1996). Industrial releases within the Great h k e s  basin: An evaluation of 
Gallon, G. (1998, January). Environmental harmonization in Canada does more than it was meant to 
Hampshire Research Associates. (1996). Evaluation of the effectiveness of pollution prevention 
Hanson. D. J. (1992, January 6). Pollution prevention becoming watchword for government, 
Harrison, K. (19%). Passing the buck: Federalism and Canadian environmental policy. Vancouver: 
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development. (1994). 
Howard, P. (1994). The death of c o m n  sense: How law ir syffocating America. New York, NY: 
Krieger, J. (1992, April 1). Pollution prevention incentives for states. Pollution Engineering, pp. 
Kmkowski. J. (1993, October 15). EPA to stress pollution prevention. Pollution Engineering, pp. 
Lester, J. P. (1990). A new federalism? Environmental policy in the states. In N. J. Vig & M. E. 
305 
Policy Studies Journal, 27:2 
Lowry. W. R. (1992). The dimensions of federalism: S fa fe  governments and pollulion control 
policies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Makin,  M., Baskir. J. N.. & Spooner, J. (1995). Issues in facility-level pollution prevention 
measurement. Environmental Progress. 14(4), 240-246. 
Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance. (1994). 1994 pollution prevention evaluation report. 
St. Paul, M N :  Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance. 
Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance. (1996). 1996 pollution prevenfion evaluation report. 
St. Paul. M N :  Minnesota Office of Environmental Assistance. 
Morton, F. L. (1996). The constitutional division of powers with respect to  the environment in 
Canada. In K. M. Holland, F. L. Morton, & B. Galligan (Eds.), Federalism and the 
environmenf: Environmeaal policymaking in Ausfralia, Canada, and the United Sfafes  @p. 
37-54). Westport. CT: Greenwood. 
O’Grady. D., & Chi, K. S. (1995). Innovators in state government. In Council of State 
Governments (Eds.), The book of the sfafes, 1994-1995 edition (pp. 496-506). Lexington, 
KY: Council of State Governments. 
Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality. (1997). Environmenfal management fr9r Oklahoma 
and the nafion: FY96 annual reporf.. Oklahoma City, OK: Oklahoma Depanment of 
Environmental Quality. 
Rabe, B. G. (1995). Integrated environmental permitting: Experience and innovation at the state 
level. Stare and Local Government Review, 27(3), 209-220. 
Rabe, B. G. (1997a). The politics of sustainable development: Impediments to pollution prevention 
and policy integration in Canada. Canadian Public Adminirtrafion, 40(3), 415-435. 
Rabe, B. G. (1997b). Power to the states: The promise and pitfalls of decentralization. In N. J. Vig 
& M. E. Kraft (Eds.), Environmenfal policy in the 1990s: Reform or reacfion? (3rd ed.) 
@p. 31-52). Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Scheberle, D. (1997). Trusf and the polifics of implemenfafion: Federalism and environmental 
policy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Schneider, M.. & Teske. P., with M. Mintrom. (1995). Public entrepreneurs: Agenfs for  change in 
American governmenf. Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. 
Skogstad. G. (1996). Intergovemmcntal relations and the politics of environmental protection in 
Canada. In K. M. Holland, F. L. Morton, & B. Galligan (Eds.), Federalism and the 
environmenf: Environmenfal policymaking in Ausfralia, Canada, and fhe United Sfafes  (pp. 
103-134). Westport. CT: Greenwood. 
Stahl, M. M. (1993, April 1). Pollution prevention through enforcement. P ollution Engineering, 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. (1997, 
February). Toxic chemicals at fhe US.-Canada and US.-Mexico borders. Washington, 
DC: United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
United States General Accounting Office. (1 994). Pollufion prevention: EPA should reexamine fhe 
objecfives and surfainability of state program. Washington, DC: United States General 
Accounting Office. 
United States Office of Technology Assessment. (1995). Environmenfal policy fools. Washington, 
DC: United States Office of Technology Assessment. 
VanderZwaag, D.. & Duncan, L. (1992). Canada and environmental protection: Confident political 
faces, uncertain legal hands. In R. Boardrnan (Ed.), Canadian environmenfal policy: 
Ecosysfem, polifics, and process (pp. 3-23). Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy. New York, NY: Basic. 
World Wildlife Fund. (1994). 7’he right 10 know: The promise of low-cosf public inventories of 
PQ. 45-47. 
toxic chemicals Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund. 
306 
